In this paper, we investigate substitution/complementarity relationships among products sold with different bundled characteristics and under different vertical arrangements.
Introduction
It is common for firms to produce multiple products. Firms that engage in successive stages of production and marketing of these products must choose among alternative forms of vertical organization, including arms-length transactions, contracting, and vertical ownership (i.e. forward or backward vertical integration). At each step along the vertical channel there is the potential for horizontal competition in which firms develop strategies for pricing and product design that can involve bundling or tie-in sales of their various products. Much research has examined the economic incentives underlying these choices (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 for an overview of this literature).
Beginning with Williamson (1968) , the influence of horizontal and vertical structures on end product pricing has been an area of intense legal and economic debate (e.g., Hart and Tirole 1990; Ordover et al. 1990; O'Brien and Shaffer 1992; McAfee and Schwartz 1994; De Fontenay and Gans 2005; Gans 2007; Rey and Tirole 2008) . On the one hand, the exercise of market power associated with tacit collusion, exclusive dealing, vertical foreclosure, and increased concentration through mergers can lead to market inefficiency. This has motivated government actions through antitrust legislation and enforcement. On the other hand, proponents of the "Chicago School" approach have argued that increased horizontal concentration or vertical integration can be motivated by efficiency gains. Firms with superior technologies, human capital, or business models are perceived to expand by purchasing the assets of poor performers or by driving these firms out of business. As a result, increased horizontal concentration or vertical integration may not lead to welfare losses (Bork 1978) . This focus on efficiency gains has contributed to reduced antitrust enforcement in the US over the last two decades (Pitofsky 2008 ).
While previous literature has examined the economics of industry concentration and efficiency gains from horizontal and vertical restructuring, 2 studying the tradeoffs between market power and efficiency remains challenging in markets involving differentiated products (e.g., Spengler 1950; Katz 1989; Hart and Tirole 1990; Whinston 2006; Rey and Tirole 2008) .
Addressing these challenges is relevant given the prevalence of product differentiation in many industries. And it appears timely given the recent call for more vigorous antitrust enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) (Varney 2009 ).
This paper examines end product pricing in horizontal and vertical markets both conceptually and empirically. We develop a Cournot model of pricing of differentiated products under imperfect competition in different vertical organizations. The model demonstrates how substitution/complementarity relationships between products and across vertical channels relate to the exercise of market power. It also provides a structural representation of pricing with an explicit characterization of the role of market power. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) has been commonly used to assess horizontal market concentration (e.g., Whinston 2006 ). Our analysis relies on a vertical HHI (termed VHHI) that captures how market concentration and vertical organization relate to the pricing of differentiated products.
The approach is then applied to an analysis of pricing in the U.S. cottonseed industry.
The cottonseed market makes an excellent case study for at least three reasons. First, the cottonseed industry is highly concentrated and now dominated by a few large seed firms (Fernandez-Cornejo 2004) . Second, the recent biotechnology revolution has stimulated the development of patented genetic material by biotech firms, which has been used as upstream inputs in the downstream cottonseed production industry. This has created new opportunities for product differentiation and price discrimination under alternative vertical structures. Third, the role of both horizontal and vertical organization in biotechnology and seed markets has been of interest to economists and anti-trust policy makers because of the surge of mergers and acquisitions in these industries since the 1990s (e.g., Graff et al. 2003; FernandezCornejo 2004; Moss 2009; Shi 2009 ). Graff et al. (2003) suggest that vertical integration may be motivated by efficiency gains obtained from the complementarity of assets in agricultural biotechnology and seed industries. Others have raised questions about whether market power may have adverse effects on efficiency (e.g., Fernandez-Cornejo 2004) . These concerns have motivated the involvement of the U.S. DOJ in a recent vertical merger in the cottonseed industry: the acquisition of Delta and Pine Land Company (DPL), the largest cottonseed company in the US, by Monsanto, one of the largest agricultural biotech companies in the world.
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Our econometric analysis evaluates the pricing of cottonseeds in the major cottonproducing region of Texas and Oklahoma. We develop a structural estimation of a pricing equation in the first part of the paper. The model motivates the use of the VHHI as a measure of concentration in both horizontal and vertical markets. We consider the case of multi-seedproduct markets, including "stacked seeds" where patented biotech traits are bundled in given cottonseed types. We also consider two vertical structures: vertical integration and licensing.
Our empirical analysis covers the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . It documents that the market share of conventionally bred cottonseeds has been declining. The market for biotech seeds (i.e., seeds with patented traits) shows patterns that vary for different firms and different seed types. Bayer
CropScience, also a large agricultural biotech company, entered the cottonseed market in 1999, and has exhibited a major growth in sales since 2002 (Shi 2009 ). Monsanto purchased a major seed-breeding firm in 2005 and expanded on its vertical integration afterwards. Our econometric analysis provides useful information on the implications of these trends and their linkages with the pricing of cottonseed.
Our investigation examines the differential pricing of conventional seeds and of patented biotech seeds. The biotech cottonseeds include two types of patented traits: herbicide tolerance (HT) and insect resistance (IR), either present independently or stacked (when HT and IR traits are bundled together). Our empirical analysis of stacked seeds finds strong evidence against component pricing and in favor of sub-additive pricing of patented traits. We also document how changing market concentration and vertical organization relate to cottonseed prices. We find that vertical organization affects pricing and the exercise of market power. Our analysis documents that seeds sold under vertical integration are priced higher than those sold through licensing.
While we find that increased market concentration is associated with a higher price in the corresponding market, our results also show evidence of cross-market complementarities that mitigate the price-enhancement associated with market power. By identifying the role of crossmarket concentrations, this stresses the need to conduct the analysis of market structure in a multi-market context.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual model is presented in section 2. The data and empirical specification are discussed in section 3. Section 4 reports the econometric results. Section 5 discusses the economic implications of our findings. Finally, section 6 presents conclusions.
Conceptual Approach
Consider markets serviced by N firms producing up to Q outputs, N = {1, …, N} denoting the set of firms and Q = {1, …, Q} being the set of outputs. The production and marketing of these outputs engages an upstream technology that can involve V alternative , being the quantity of the m-th good produced by the n-th firm under the τ-th vertical structure, m ∈ Q, n ∈ N, τ ∈ V.
Each firm maximizes profit across marketing channels. With the potential for implicit or explicit contracts between upstream technology provider and the downstream firm, we examine how the exercise of market power in both horizontal and vertical markets is associated with pricing in the end-use market. We allow for vertical as well as horizontal product differentiation.
This takes place through quality choices, labels, brands, advertising, etc. Vertical product differentiation means that pricing can vary across vertical structures.
The price-dependent demand for the m-th output under the τ-th vertical structure is denoted by . Then, profit for the n-th firm is:
, where C n (y n ) represents the n-th firm's total costs of production and marketing. Assuming
Cournot behavior, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the n-th firm for the m-th output in the τ-th vertical structure are:
Equation (1c) Assume that the cost function of the n-th firm takes the quadratic form (1a)- (1c), the fixed cost F n (S n ) can also play a role. Indeed, fixed costs must be recovered to guarantee the sustainability of each firm. This typically implies a departure from marginal cost pricing. Fixed costs can come from two potential sources: the upstream industry (e.g., R&D investment); and the downstream industry (e.g., fixed cost in establishing a vertical organization). Both fixed costs and variable costs are relevant in evaluating the efficiency of a firm. For example, as shown by Baumol et al. (1982) , both fixed costs and variable costs can contribute to economies of scope.
And economies of scope can generate efficiency gains by reducing the cost of production for multi-output firms.
Let the price-dependent demand for the kth product under the u-th vertical structure be summing across all n, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1: The pricing of the m-th product under the τ-th vertical structure satisfies
where 
Given that H km,uτ → 0 under perfect competition and using (2), it follows that M mτ in (4) provides a measure of the market power component of prices. With H km,uτ shares across all firms in the relevant market. 4 When there is a single product (Q = 1) and a single vertical structure (V = 1), note that our VHHI measure H 11,11 is just the classical HHI.
Given c 11,11 ≥ 0 and α 11,11 < 0, equations (2)- (4) indicate that an increase in the HHI, H 11,11 , (simulating an increase in market power) is associated with an increase in M 11 , and thus an increase in price p 11 .
Equations (2) These are testable restrictions that will be investigated in our empirical analysis below.
What happens to equation (4) 
where
is the n-th firm market share for the k-th product. M m in (4') gives the market power component of the price of the m-th product (p m ). In this case, note that H km is a concentration measure across the k-th and m-th horizontal markets, and it satisfies
e. it is a weighted average of our VHHI's H km,uτ .
Taking the analysis one step further, what would happen to equation (4) 
is the n-th firm's overall market share. M in (4")
gives the market power component of price p when all products are perfect substitutes. In this case, note that H is the classical HHI providing a measure of overall market concentration. And it
e. it is a weighted average of our VHHI's H km,uτ . This makes it clear that when all products are perfect substitutes, our approach reduces to a single market analysis and to the HHI approach commonly found in the literature (e.g., Whinston 2006) . It also shows how our VHHI generalizes previous analyses in the presence of product differentiation (when products are not perfect substitutes). It identifies the roles of substitution/complementarity among products and their effects on pricing under imperfect competition. Importantly, our generalization allows for product differentiation both in horizontal and vertical organizations.
Equation (3) indicates that the VHHI's H km,uτ provide the relevant information to assess the role of market power in horizontal and vertical markets. It can provide a basis for empirical investigations of the pricing of differentiated products in a vertical sector under imperfect competition. This is illustrated next in an application to the U.S. cottonseed industry. In this application, the upstream firm develops the seed production technology (i.e., a biotech firm developing patented genetic material that can be inserted in the basic seed), and the downstream firm uses the upstream technology to produce and sell the biotech seeds to farmers.
Data and Model Specification
Our analysis uses a data set providing detailed information on the U.S. cottonseed market.
The data were collected by dmrkynetec [hereafter dmrk]. The dmrk data come from a stratified sample of U.S. cotton farmers surveyed annually in 2002-2007. 5 The survey provides farm-level information on seed purchases, acreage, seed types, technology fees, and seed prices. It was 5 The survey is stratified to over-sample producers with large acreage.
collected using computer assisted telephone interviews. Farmers typically buy their seeds locally, and seeds are usually developed for different agro-climatic conditions in different regions. We define the "local market" at the Crop Reporting Districts (CRD) 6 level. Our analysis focuses on the High Plains of Texas and Oklahoma, a major cotton-producing region.
Using equation (3), we introduce a price equation with binary terms that partitions cottonseed transactions based on different genetic characteristics and different vertical structures.
Equation (3) Note that our analysis allows costs (both fixed and variable) to vary across vertical structures. Under vertical integration v, the R&D fixed cost can be recovered directly by the integrated firm but the firm may possibly incur additional transaction costs associated with integration. Under licensing ℓ, a royalty fee is paid by the seed company (licensee) to the biotech firm (licensor). The fee raises the marginal cost of the licensee and should help the licensor recover its R&D investment. In general, the two vertical structures can vary both in terms of efficiency and in terms of exercise of market power. Also, both assessments can be affected by the multi-product nature of the market. For example, the presence and magnitude of economies 6 A crop-reporting district (CRD) is defined by the US Department of Agriculture to reflect local agroclimatic conditions. In general, a CRD is larger than a county but smaller than a state.
of scope can vary between vertical structures. And as discussed above, the presence of complementarity (or substitution) across vertically differentiated products can reduce (enhance) the firms' ability to exercise market power. The empirical analysis presented below will shed some useful lights on these issues.
We begin with a standard model of hedonic pricing given by:
where the price for a seed of type m sold under the τ-th vertical structure is hypothesized to vary with its characteristics (e.g., following Rosen 1974), X is a vector of covariates that capture various aspects of the market for seeds and ε mτ is an error term with mean zero and finite variance. The middle term on the righthand side of equation (5a) 
where M mτ → 0 under perfect competition. Equation (6) provides a convenient measure of the effect of imperfect competition under various vertical structures.
To illustrate, the equation estimated for the price of the conventional seed (T 1 = 1) is
and for the single trait IR seed (T 3 = 1), the price equations for licensed and integrated seeds are, respectively, Each CRD is presumed to represent the relevant market area for each transaction; thus, all H terms are calculated at that level. Each purchase observation is at the farm-level. The price p in equation (5a) is the net seed price paid by farmers (in $ per bag 7 ). Table 1 contains summary statistics of the data used in the analysis.
The relevant covariates X include location, year dummies, each farm's total cotton acreage, and binary terms covering the range of how each purchase was sourced. The location 7 In the cottonseed market, farmers used to pay the price in two parts: the "seed price" and then the "technology fee" if the seed were a biotech seed with patented genetic trait technology. More recently, biotech companies changed the pricing scheme, so that farmers only pay a single price that contains both the "seed price" and the "technology fee". To facilitate the analysis of pricing over the study period, we normalize the two part seed pricing in earlier years into the same single pricing format in recent years, i.e., $ per bag, with 250,000 seeds per bag.
variables are defined as state dummies, capturing spatial heterogeneity in cropping systems and state institutions. Since the CRDs in the two states in our sample are adjacent to each other, we do not expect weather patterns and yield potential to differ substantially across the state border.
The year dummies are included to capture the advances in genetic technology, and possible event effects throughout the years of the study. Farm acreage captures possible price discrimination effects related to farm size. Note that farmers may choose different sources for different seed varieties. Including source of purchase as an explanatory variable in (5a) captures possible price discrimination schemes affecting the seed price paid by farmers.
We address two critical econometric issues. First, the potential for endogeneity of the VHHIs is a concern for our econometric estimation of equation (5a) 8 The endogeneity of our VHHI terms is at the heart of the foundational points emerging from the Chicago School. Indeed, if increased concentration evolves from the incentives associated with the drive toward efficiency, then price and market structure are jointly determined. A second econometric concern involved the potential for heteroskedastic disturbances in the error term in (5a). A Pagan-Hall test 11 of the IV model found strong evidence against homoscedasticity. Unobserved farm-specific factors such as variations in pest populations, soil quality, rainfall, temperature, etc. are likely sources of the heteroscedasticity. While it is reasonable to anticipate these factors to differ across farms, they are not likely to be much different within a farm. This suggests that the variance of the error term in (5a) would exhibit heteroscedasticity, with clustering at the farm level.
Econometric Results
Equations (5a) Table 2 reports the regression results. For comparison purpose, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results with robust standard errors are also reported. The OLS estimation results differ from the 2SLS results substantially, suggesting that our use of IV estimation is needed to deal with endogeneity bias. The analysis presented below relies on the IV/2SLS
estimates.
We first discuss the estimates of how prices vary across seed types and vertical structures, followed by a discussion of the estimated effects of market power. Compared to conventional seeds, the results show that all biotech seeds receive a price premium that varies with the vertical structure. We have argued in section 2 that the effects of VHHI H km,uτ , k ≠ m, and/or u ≠ τ depend on the substitutability/complementarity relationship between the type-k seed in u-th market structure and the type-m seed in τ -th market structure. We expect that an increase in the VHHI will be associated with a rise (decrease) in the price if the two types of seed are substitutes 
Implications
While the results in Table 2 reveal the factors affecting the price of cottonseeds, the effects of changes in market conditions are complex in a multi-market context. In this section, we explore the implications of our econometric estimates by simulating how alternative market scenarios are associated with changes in cottonseed pricing. We focus our attention on two sets of scenarios: 1) the impact of stacking/bundling of biotech traits; and 2) the impacts of market size and changing market structures. To support hypothesis testing across scenarios, all simulated prices are bootstrapped.
Effects of Stacking/Bundling in Different Markets
The implications of stacking for cottonseed prices are presented in Table 3 . Evaluated at market conditions in Texas in 2006, Table 3 shows that the prices for biotech seeds (T 2 , T 3 and T 4 ) are significantly higher than the price of conventional seeds (T 1 ). This is true under both licensing and vertical integration. The price premium paid for biotech traits (compared to conventional seeds) implies that biotech seeds provide farm productivity gains (by increasing yield and reducing labor or pesticide inputs). It also indicates that these gains generate farm profits that are captured in part by biotech and seed firms. Table 3 shows that the price of stacked seeds (T 4 ) is higher than the price of single-trait seeds (T 2 or T 3 ). It also reports stacking effects by comparing the price premium of stacked seeds (T 4 ) versus the sum of the premium for single-trait seeds (T 2 and T 3 ). The results show that the premium for stacked seeds is less than the sum of the premium for single trait seeds. The difference is statistically significant. This infers a rejection of component pricing for biotech seeds (where seeds would be valued as the sum of their component values) in favor of subadditive pricing (where stacked/bundled seeds are sold at a discount compared to the pricing of the individual components). To the extent that both HT and IR technology increases productivity, this provides an incentive for farmers to purchase stacked/bundled seeds (as compared to singletrait biotech seeds). The discounting of bundled traits may reflect complementarities and economies of scope in the production and marketing of biotech traits. In this case, the joint production and marketing of biotech traits may contribute to lowering cost, which may be shared in part with farmers in the form of price discounts offered by seed companies. Table 3 also shows how vertical structures affect pricing. It reports that seed prices are lower under licensing than under vertical integration. The difference is statistically significant for HT (T 2 ) and stacked seeds (T 4 ). This indicates that vertical integration contributes to increasing the price paid by farmers.
12 Finally, Table 3 shows that stacking effects do not vary systematically across vertical structures: sub-additivity in pricing applies under both vertical integration and licensing, and the associated price discounts are not statistically different between the two vertical organizations.
Effects of Changing Market Size and Market Structures
The Table 4 illustrates the important role played by cross-market concentration. Generally declining levels of own VHHIs are associated to three statistically significant price declines. However, by . These results underscore the fact that complementarity effects identified in our econometric analysis impact the linkages between market concentrations and pricing. This also stresses the importance of evaluating changing market structures in a multi-product framework.
Decomposition of the market power effect
Equations (4) and (6) 
. This can be decomposed as follows:
The purpose of our next simulation is to evaluate two specific time periods when The patterns of decomposition differ between the two scenarios. This indicates how pricing behavior can change with market conditions. For example, entry/exit and merger/acquisition can affect both market size and multi-market concentrations. In our simulations, the different sign of the two components also suggests the importance of complementarity and substitutability across products, with net effects that depend on market conditions.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of differentiated products and vertical strategies by the biotechnology firms in the U.S. cottonseed market. The approach advances the measurement of industry concentration to consider substitution/complementarity relationships among differentiated products delivered under different vertical structures. The model is flexible and allows for evaluation of the implications of market restructuring.
Applied to pricing in the U.S. cottonseed market, the econometric analysis provides useful information on the implications of product differentiation and vertical organization. It evaluates the differential pricing of conventional seeds as well as patented biotech seeds, including herbicide tolerance (HT) seeds, insect resistant (IR) seeds, and stacked/bundled seeds.
The model provides for a considerable flexibility in understanding the pricing of cottonseed with different GM traits sold in different vertical structures. Three major results are reported. First, we find that own-market concentration is positively associated with higher prices. This results fits the long-standing interpretation that increasing concentration infers market power to firms that in turn raise price. Second, our estimates show evidence of cross-market complementarities that imply lower prices will occur in the presence of increased concentration across different seed markets. These complementary effects are important and suggest that firms may pass on efficiency gains (perhaps from scope economies) to farmers in the form of lower prices. Finally, our analysis shows that vertical organization affects pricing. We find that pricing of cottonseed is higher under vertical integration than under a licensing arrangement.
We also performed simulations that measure price changes in response to changes in groups of variables. These simulations provided additional insights on the pricing of cottonseeds in ways that capture the complex interactions in the VHHI and market size. When we focused a simulation on only changes to the own VHHI, i.e., the classical HHIs, the results underscored the changing price structure in each seed market under different vertical structures. In three seed markets (conventional, HT-licensed, and IR-licensed), lower concentration led to price declines.
However, increased concentration in stacked IR/HT seeds and in vertically integrated HT seeds both led to higher prices. A more comprehensive simulation was also conducted for two periods (2002-2004) and (2005-2006) and we decomposed the overall change in the market power component into two parts: the market size effect and the market concentration effect. The simulations illustrated the joint effects of changes in own and cross-market concentrations along with the effects of expanding or contracting markets. The results provide a foundation for a better understanding of new entrants and mergers in markets with complex vertical and product different. This simulation approach is applicable for pre-merger analysis of industries producing differentiated products and exhibiting similar market complexities. a Statistical significance is noted as: * 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1 % level. b Scenario I includes the years when Bayer CropScience gained market share; scenario II covers the years when Monsanto became a vertically integrated biotech firm after merging with an established seed company (Stoneville).
